The alleged negligence of the codefendant of the Atlanta Lumber Company was not the sole proximate cause of the injuries sued for, and the court did not err in overruling the company's general demurrer.

C. E. Carmack, Mrs. Beatrice C. Davidson and Mrs. Veona C. Beggs, as the only survivors of their deceased mother, Minnie Lee Carmack, sued Atlanta Lumber Company and Louis Joseph Levitas for the death of their mother which was allegedly caused by the joint negligence of the defendants. The petition alleges in substance as follows: Spring Street, Peters Street and Trinity Avenue are public streets and highways lying within the City of Atlanta; Spring Street, at the point where it intersects Trinity Avenue and Peters Street, runs in a generally northerly and southerly direction; Trinity Avenue intersects Spring Street on the east side and at an angle of 85@0=; Peters Street intersects on the westerly side of Spring Street at an angle of about 45 0 and the mouth of said street at the intersection point is substantially opposite the mouth of Trinity Avenue; Peters Street at the point of intersection runs generally in a southwesterly and northeasterly direction; on or about July 13, 1955, at approximately 11 a.m., the plaintiffs' mother was attempting to cross Trinity Avenue in a southerly direction within the designated crosswalk, from the northeast corner to the southeast corner of said intersection as formed by Trinity Avenue and Spring Street; she commenced to cross Trinity Avenue when the green light was facing her and traffic entering the intersection from Trinity Avenue was facing a red light; before she reached the middle of Trinity Avenue, the traffic light at the intersection changed to green for traffic entering the intersection from Trinity Avenue, allowing such traffic to go straight across the intersection into Peters Street or to turn left or right onto Spring Street; just as the light changed, the defendant Levitas, while traveling west on Trinity Avenue in his automobile, entered and traversed said crosswalk without keeping a lookout for pedestrians within the crosswalk and struck the plaintiffs' mother with great force and carried her forward into the intersection; at the same time, Charlie Williams, an employee of Atlanta Lumber Company, was driving a Ford truck in a northeasterly direction along Peters Street; he proceeded into the intersection formed by Peters Street, Spring Street and Trinity Avenue, executing an illegal left turn, proceeding north on Spring Street, without giving a hand or mechanical signal indicating his intention to turn left; at the time Williams made said left turn, the traffic light at the intersection was red, forbidding traffic entering the intersection from Peters Street from making a left turn into Spring Street; as the defendant Levitas proceeded into the intersection carrying the

Atlanta Lumber Company's general demurrer was overruled and it excepts.

Atlanta Lumber Company contends that the negligence of the defendant Levitas must in law be considered as the sole proximate cause of the injuries sued for the reason that the consequences of the alleged negligence of the Atlanta Lumber Company were too remote because it was not bound to anticipate the consequences of its alleged negligence in combining with the negligence of the defendant Levitas to produce the injuries. This contention is without merit. The Atlanta Lumber Company was not required to anticipate the particular consequences which ensued, no matter how unusual they might have been. It is sufficient that in ordinary prudence it might have foreseen that some injury would result from its act or omission or that "consequences of a generally injurious nature might result." Williams v. Grier, 196 Ga. 327, 337 (26 S. E. 2d 698) and cases cited; Blunt v. Spears, 93 Ga. App. 623, 628 (92 S. E. 2d 573), and cases cited. The circumstances of this case are very unusual but it does not seem to us to be debatable that the purpose of the ordinance in question, prohibiting a left turn in to Spring Street against a red light, was the prevention of collisions with vehicles going into the intersection from the opposite direction. It is clear to us that the driver of the Atlanta Lumber Company's truck should have anticipated that injury might reasonably result from his alleged negligence. The superseding cause principle, stated in Southern Railway Co. v. Webb, 116 Ga. 152 (42 S. E. 395, 59 L. R. A. 109), and followed in decisions too numerous to mention, need not be repeated here.

The court did not err in overruling the Atlanta Lumber Company's general demurrer.