1. Where the testimony in an abandonment case discloses that there is a judgment for alimony for the support of minor children, with which the defendant has failed to comply, it is not error for the trial court to charge to the effect that, if the jury finds there is a valid judgment for alimony uncomplied with, they would be authorized to find the defendant guilty, provided they believe him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to the other essential ingredients of the offense of abandonment.

2. The fact that a divorce decree has been entered placing custody of minor children in the mother will not bar a prosecution for abandonment on the theory that the defendant cannot "abandon" children whose custody has been taken from him by process of law. The evidence here supported the verdict of guilty of the offense of abandonment.

Ernest Dyer was convicted in the Superior Court of Hall County of abandoning his minor children. The mother of the children, the only witness, testified: that she was living in Hall County when her husband left her; that the children live with her and are minors; that the defendant did not give her enough money to buy food and clothing for them; and that the children have to be awarded aid by the Welfare Department of the State for their necessaries. A decree of divorce, awarding custody of the children to the mother, and providing stated payments to her for the children's support, was introduced in evidence. The defendant in his statement admitted that he had not made the scheduled payments of $75 a month under the decree, and said he had been unable to earn enough money to do so.

Upon conviction, a motion for a new trial was filed on the general grounds and later amended by the addition of two special grounds. The overruling of this motion is assigned as error.

2. The first special ground of the amended motion for new trial not being argued by counsel is treated as abandoned. It is contended, under the general grounds, that there is no evidence to prove that the abandonment, if any, on the part of the defendant was wilful. The desertion contemplated under Code 74-9902 must be wilful and voluntary--that is, without coercive cause. McDaniel v. Campbell, 78 Ga. 188 (2). As defined in Blackwell v. State, 48 Ga. App. 221 (172 S. E. 670), it means a wilful forsaking and desertion of the duties of parenthood. It is true that some of the duties of parenthood--indeed, most of them were removed from the father by the decree placing the children's custody in their mother. One duty, however, of parenthood did remain--that of support. The mother testified that the defendant left her and the children in Hall County. Thereafter, he failed to provide the parental support which still remained his duty. He contended that this was not wilful on his part, as he had been unable to work, but apparently the jury did not believe his statement. They were therefore authorized, under the decision of Ozburn v. State, supra, to find that there had been a wilful and voluntary desertion, and also to find that the children were in a dependent condition.

The trial court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial as amended.

Judgment affirmed. Gardner, P. J., and Carlisle, J., concur.