1. A plaintiff may rely upon an act or omission as constituting negligence as a matter of fact under the circumstances, or upon the violation of a statute or ordinance as amounting to negligence per se, and the facts may be so pleaded as to show negligence of both classes in the same action. 2-4. The special demurrers as to the sufficiency of certain allegations of fact in the petition were properly overruled.

5. An ordinance covering unrelated subject matters is not for that reason rendered invalid; the ordinance in question, limiting the speed of vehicles within a municipality to 25 miles per hour on streets and to 15 miles per hour at street intersections, was sufficiently definite to constitute the violation of such an ordinance as negligence per se; the said ordinance was not superseded by the provisions of the act of 1939, and it does not appear as a matter of law from the allegations of the petition that the plaintiff was not within the class of persons intended to be protected by the provisions of the ordinance.

6. (a) Municipal authorities, having charter power to enact ordinances "necessary to enforce peace, order and good government," and having "general and exclusive jurisdiction over the streets, alleys, by-ways, sidewalks and commons and public squares" of a city, were authorized to enact the ordinance in question, providing for maximum speeds of vehicles on streets and at street intersections within the corporate limits of the city.

(b) Where a complete ordinance is set out as an exhibit attached to the petition, and the ordinance appears regular on its face and recites that it was passed in regular session of the mayor and council of the city, it is presumed that the ordinance was legally and properly passed, and the plaintiff need not allege how it was passed.

7. The court did not err in overruling the general demurrer to the petition.

Alice West Jones brought an action for damages against the Atlantic Company and Cleveland Lawrence, and made substantially the following allegations in her amended petition: (3) The defendants have jointly injured and damaged the plaintiff in the sum of $75,000 by reason of the facts hereinafter set out. (4) On April 28, 1950, the defendant, Atlantic Company, owned and used in the operation of its business a 1949 Chevrolet truck, and on said date, at about 6 a.m., the defendant, Cleveland Lawrence, an employee of the defendant company, while in the employment and on the business of said company, drove said truck west on East Montgomery Street and trained into North Wayne Street, in Milledgeville, Georgia. East Montgomery Street at said place is 40 feet wide, is paved, and is about 2 feet higher in the center than on each side, and said street intersects with North Wayne Street at right angles. North Wayne Street is 50 feet wide, is paved with asphalt, and is 3 feet higher in the center than on each side. There is a railroad track with two rails down the middle of North Wayne Street. Both streets are heavily traveled at all hours of the day and night. (5) After turning at said intersection, Lawrence traveled a distance of 45 feet from the intersection, when he suddenly and without warning drove said truck across the curb of North Wayne Street, across a parkway 10 feet wide, and onto and across the sidewalk which was 4 feet wide, and then ran into the plaintiff who was standing at a wall 2 feet high at the edge of the sidewalk in front of a residence at 301 North Wayne Street, on the east side of the street. (6) Lawrence, while acting for the defendant, Atlantic Company, as above described, was driving said Chevrolet truck west on East Montgomery Street at a high and negligent rate of speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour, in violation of an ordinance of the City of Milledgeville, which limited the speed of said truck on said street to 25 miles per hour. (7, 8) Lawrence also drove said truck into said intersection and turned the corner at a speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour, in violation of an ordinance of the City of Milledgeville, which limits the speed of vehicles crossing intersecting streets and rounding corners to 15 miles per hour. (9) The defendant, Lawrence, after turning the corner at said intersection, negligently and recklessly drove across the 10-foot parkway and the sidewalk, and struck and injured the plaintiff. (10) Lawrence was negligently operating said truck at a greater speed than was reasonable and safe, having due regard for the width, grade and character of said street, in violation of the laws of Georgia. (11) Lawrence was negligently operating said truck for the defendant, Atlantic Company, when the truck was not provided and equipped with efficient and serviceable brakes, as required by Code 68-302. (12) Lawrence was further negligent in the operation of said truck in that he was not maintaining a proper lookout ahead. (13) The negligence of the defendant, Lawrence, as set out above, all occurred while he was acting for and in the employment of Atlantic Company, and said negligence was the

proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. (14)

Said truck struck the plaintiff, knocking her into and against the stone wall, and injuring her legs, one of which was amputated above the knee and the other fractured near the ankle. (15) As a result of said injuries, the plaintiff will be incapacitated for the balance of her natural life. (16) As a result of said injuries, the plaintiff will never be able to walk again, and has suffered pain, and will continue to undergo pain and suffering for the rest of her life. (17) Prior to receiving said injuries, the plaintiff was in good health and was an able bodied woman, capable of earning $25 to $30 per week, and by reason of said permanent injuries, the plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled and will never be able to work and labor again. (18) Lawrence was negligent in the following particulars: (b) In that he drove said truck in a westerly direction along East Montgomery Street at a reckless and negligent rate of speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour in violation of the ordinance of the City of Milledgeville, Georgia, which limits the speed of motor vehicles at said place to 25 miles per hour, which was negligence per se. (c) In that he drove said truck into the intersection of East Montgomery Street and North Wayne Street at a speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour in violation of an ordinance of the City of Milledgeville which limits the speed of motor vehicles at said time and place to 15 miles per hour, which was negligence per se. (e) In that he drove said truck around the corner of East Montgomery Street and North Wayne Street at a speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour, in violation of an ordinance of the City of Milledgeville which limits the speed to 15 miles per hour, which was negligence per se. (f) In that he drove said truck along East Montgomery Street and into the intersection of said street with North Wayne Street, rounding the corner and for a distance of 45 feet on North Wayne Street, at a speed that was greater than was reasonable and safe, having due regard for the width, grade, character, and common use of such streets, in violation of the laws of Georgia, which was negligence per se. (g) In that he failed to have said truck under control when he drove from North Wayne Street in an easterly direction across the curb, parkway, and sidewalk in front of the residence at 301 North Wayne Street, and into and against the plaintiff's body. (h) In that he failed to maintain a proper lookout at said time and place. (i) In that he drove said truck at said time and place when it was not equipped with efficient and serviceable brakes, as required by the laws of Georgia, which was negligence per se. (19) The plaintiff was 35 years of age and had a normal expectancy of 31 years when she received her injuries. (20) Attached, marked "Exhibit A", and made a part of the petition, was a copy of the ordinance of the City of Milledgeville which limits the speed on East Montgomery Street and North Wayne Street to 25 miles per hour, and limits the speed in the intersection of said streets to 15 miles per hour. Also attached to and made a part of the petition was a copy of the complete ordinance of February 4, 1924, and of the amendment thereto, marked "Exhibit B."

Section 14 was entitled, "Speed," and stated, "Be it further ordained (a) that it shall be unlawful to drive any motor vehicle at a higher rate of speed than twenty (20) miles an hour (b) that vehicles shall slow down to a rate of speed not greater than twelve (12) miles per hour when crossing intersecting streets, rounding corners, and passing churches during the hours of service therein (c) the speed of vehicles shall at all times be controlled by traffic conditions; it shall never exceed the limits above set out, and it may be deemed reckless although within these limits, depending in all instances upon traffic conditions . . ." Section 17 provided for penalties for violations of the ordinance, to be administered by the recorder; and section 18 repealed ordinances or parts thereof in conflict with the ordinance. The ordinance recited that it was "Passed in regular session of the Mayor and Council of the City of Milledgeville this February 4, 1924," and it was signed by the mayor and the clerk.

The amending ordinance provided that "It is hereby ordained by the City of Milledgeville that the ordinance regulating vehicular traffic in the City of Milledgeville passed on February 4, 1924, be, and the same is hereby amended as follows: . . 2. Be it further ordained that Section 14 of said Ordinance be amended by striking the figure 20 where they appear in said section and insert in lieu thereof the figures 25; and by striking the figures 12 where they appear in said section and insert in lieu thereof the figures 15. . . ."

The certificate was as follows: "Georgia, Baldwin County. I, Lamar Ham, do hereby certify that I am Clerk of the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Milledgeville and custodian of minutes, ordinances and records of said City of Milledgeville. I do hereby certify that the foregoing pages of typewritten matter as initialed by me is a true and correct copy of the ordinance of said City and the.amendments thereto just as it appears on record on the minutes of said City of Milledgeville." The Certificate was signed by Lamar F. Ham.

The defendant, Atlantic Company, first demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not set forth a cause of action and on several special grounds of demurrer. The plaintiff, by amendment in response to the demurrers, added to paragraph 4 of her petition the matter following the first sentence therein, as set out above, added Exhibit A, and made a change in paragraph 18 (g).

The defendant renewed its demurrers to the petition as amended, and demurred to the matter added by amendment; and the plaintiff then further amended by adding Exhibit B, setting out the whole traffic ordinance, and by alleging paragraph 18 (g) in the form set out above.

The defendant again renewed its demurrer& previously filed to the petition as amended, and also demurred specially to certain matter in the second amendment and to certain paragraphs of the original petition. The grounds of the special demurrers are set out in the opinion. The court overruled every ground of the demurrers to the petition as amended, and the defendant, Atlantic Company, excepted to that judgment.

1. The petition was not subject to demurrer on the ground that there was a misjoinder of causes of action and of defendants in that general grounds of negligence and grounds of negligence per se were both alleged in the same count. The plaintiff may rely upon an act or omission as constituting negligence as a matter of fact under the circumstances, or upon the violation of a statute or ordinance as amounting to negligence per se, and the facts may be so pleaded as to show negligence of both classes in the same action. Williams v. Grier, 196 Ga. 327 (3), 339 (26 S. E. 2d, 698); Donaldson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 186 Ga. 870, 873 (199 S. E. 213, 128 A. L. R. 456); Giles v. Voiles, 144 Ga. 853 (88 S. E. 207); Thompson v. Powell, 60 Ga. App. 796 (5 S. E. 2d, 260); Pollard v. Savage, 55 Ga. App. 470, 474 (190 S. E. 423).

2. Paragraph 18 (f) of the petition was first demurred to on the ground that it was irrelevant and a conclusion of the pleader, in that it did not disclose the width, grade, character and common use of the streets therein referred to, but this criticism was answered by the amendment to paragraph 4 of the petition, which alleged the width, grade, character and common use of East Montgomery Street and North Wayne Street. The further grounds of demurrer to this paragraph, in regard to matters not affected by the amendment thereto, and the demurrer to paragraph 17 of the petition, filed after the appearance day of the case although this paragraph was not amended at all, were properly overruled, as these demurrers came too late. Pierce v. Harrison, 199 Ga. 197 (5 a) (33 S. E. 2d, 680); Garner v. Wolport, 84 Ga. App. 876 (1) (67 S. E. 2d, 824).

3. Paragraphs 18 (g), 18 (h), and 18 (i), alleged that the defendant, Lawrence, was negligent: in failing to have the truck under control when he drove it across the curb, parkway, and sidewalk and struck the plaintiff; in failing to maintain a proper lookout at said time and place; and in driving the truck when it was not equipped with efficient and serviceable brakes. The demurrer to paragraph 18 (g), on the ground that it was not set out how the operator of the truck failed to have it under control, was properly overruled, for the facts alleged in the petition show that the driver of the truck did not have it under control in driving over the curb, parkway and sidewalk of the street. See in this connection, Southeastern Express v. Nightingale, 33 Ga. App. 515 (3) (126 S. E. 915); Western & Atlantic R. v. Peterson, 168 Ga. 259 (3) (147 S. E. 513); Garmon v. Cassell, 78 Ga. App. 730 (52 S. E. 2d, 631). Paragraphs 18 (h) and 18 (i) were said to be irrelevant and conclusions, in the first demurrers thereto, but we think these were allegations of facts. The plaintiff need not allege his evidence. Furthermore, these alleged facts show conduct such that injury to persons within the range of operation of the truck might or might not have been reasonably foreseen, and so presented a question for a jury as to whether the defendant had violated a duty to the plaintiff at the time and place in question, and were not irrelevant. The demurrers to paragraphs 18 (h) and 18 (i) of the petition were properly overruled.

5. The ordinance attached to the petition was demurred to on the ground that it contained subject matter different from that described in its caption and covered several unrelated matters in one ordinance. Article 3, section 7, paragraph 8 of the Constitution of 1877 (Code, 2-1808), in effect when the ordinance in question was passed and providing that "No law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject matter, or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof," has no application to ordinances passed by municipal authorities, Waring v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 60 Ga. 93 (1); Padrosa v. Amos, 175 Ga. 413 (1) (165 S. E. 248); and see the corresponding paragraph of the Constitution of 1945 (Code, Ann., 2-1908), omitting the words, "or ordinances." An ordinance covering unrelated subject matters is not for that reason rendered invalid.

Another ground of the demurrer to the ordinance was that it was too indefinite to fix and impose a duty on the part of the defendant or to constitute the violation of such an ordinance as negligence per se. Section 14 of the ordinance provides that it shall be unlawful to drive any motor vehicle at a higher rate of speed than 20 miles per hour, and that vehicles shall slow down to a speed not greater than 12 miles per hour when crossing intersecting streets or rounding corners. It further provides that the speed of vehicles shall be controlled by traffic conditions but is not to exceed the limits set out. By the amendment of 1932, the speed limit was raised to 25 miles per hour, and to 15 miles per hour when crossing intersections or rounding corners. The allegations of the petition show that the defendant was proceeding at speeds greater than those prescribed as a maximum for streets or intersections, as the case might be, and the ordinance was definite as to what such maximum speeds were.

The demurrers to paragraphs 18 (b), 18 (c) and 18 (e) of the petition asserted that the ordinance alleged to have been violated by the defendant was illegal and created no duty to the plaintiff on the part of the defendant. It is contended that Code (Ann. Supp.) 68-301 (e) (Ga. L. 1939, p. 302, 10), providing that "the foregoing provisions as to speed shall supersede and stand in lieu of all other Georgia legislation in respect to speed of motor vehicles upon the public streets and highways," superseded the ordinance of Milledgeville regulating the speed on that city's public streets. But the same act also provides "that nothing in this Act shall affect the rights of municipalities to regulate speed of motor vehicles within their corporate limits, when said speed limit is equal to or less than the maximum speed provided for in this Act." Ga. L. 1939, p. 298, 2 (e). Code 68-312, codified from Ga. L. 1927, p. 240, also provides that, "Nothing contained in this law shall be construed as changing or interfering with any regulation or ordinance which has heretofore been or may hereafter be adopted by any municipality, regulating the running or operation of motor vehicles described in this law; and nothing in this law shall prevent cities and towns from regulating, by reasonable ordinance, the rate of speed except as provided hereinafter." A similar provision was made in the act of 1921 (Ga. L. 1921, p. 258, 7), which was in effect when the ordinance in question was passed in 1924. The legislative intend was not to supersede municipal ordinances regulating speeds of vehicles in municipalities within the speed limits provided by the statutes. See George A. Rheman Co. v. May, 71 Ga. App. 651, 657 (3) (31 S. E. 2d, 738). The ordinance of the City of Milledgeville as pleaded was not illegal or superseded as contended in this ground of the demurrer.

The plaintiff was alleged to have been standing at a point 45 feet from the intersection of East Montgomery and North Wayne Streets, and on the east side of North Wayne Street. It is contended that the plaintiff was not in the class of persons which the ordinance was intended to protect, in limiting the speed of vehicles on East Montgomery Street and in said intersection, which were the places where the ordinance was alleged to have been violated by the defendant, Lawrence, while the plaintiff was standing at another place on North Wayne Street. Of course, if the defendant had been operating the truck within the legal rate of speed in going through the intersection and rounding the corner, his violation of the speed limit on East Montgomery Street, before he reached its intersection with North Wayne Street, on which street the plaintiff was standing, would have had no connection with the injury sustained by the plaintiff. Yet, if the defendant Lawrence were exceeding the speed limit before reaching the intersection, as well as while making the turn around the corner and through the intersection, as alleged, then both of these violations may be considered by a jury to have contributed concurrently in causing the plaintiff's injury. To be within the protection of ordinances limiting the speed of vehicles in street intersections, the person injured need not be actually in the intersection; in the case of Moye v. Reddick, 20 Ga. App. 649 (93 S. E. 256), the plaintiff was injured while crossing a street 35 yards from an intersection, and it was held that the trial court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether a violation of the speed limit by the defendant had occurred, and, if so, whether such violation had contributed to the plaintiff's being injured. A similar ruling was made in Huckabee v. Grace, 48 Ga. App. 621 (2) (173 S. E. 744), where the plaintiff was near the place where an alley crossed a street. Also see O'Dowd v. Newnham, 13 Ga. App. 220 (8) (80 S. E. 36); Eubanks v. Mullis, 51 Ga. App. 728, 732 (181 S. E. 604). It does not appear as a matter of law that the plaintiff in the present case was not within the class of persons intended to be protected by the provisions of the ordinance alleged to have been violated. The demurrers to paragraphs 18 (b), 18 (c) and 18 (e), and to the ordinance as first pleaded, were properly overruled.

6. The demurrer to the amended ordinance of the City of Milledgeville, as set out in Exhibit B, asserts that the city had no charter power to pass the ordinance regulating traffic. Section 2 of the new charter of the City of Milledgeville (Ga. L. 1900,. p. 345), in effect when the ordinance in question was passed, provided that "Said mayor and aldermen may enact from time to time such ordinances, by-laws, rules and regulations as may be necessary to enforce peace, order and good government and to carry out generally the power and authority conferred by this Act and the laws of Georgia." According to section 21 of the charter (Ga. L. 1900, p. 350), "They [the mayor and aldermen] shall have general and exclusive jurisdiction over the streets, alleys, by-ways, sidewalks and commons and public squares of said city." In the case of Howell v. Board of Commissioners of Quitman, 169 Ga. 74 (1) (149 S. E. 779), it was held that similar Charter provisions of the City of Quitman were sufficient "to confer police power to enact ordinances for the convenience and safety of the public, and to that end establish and maintain streets and sidewalks and exercise 'full and complete control' over them, including regulation of traffic thereon." See also, Gardner v. City of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167 (28 S. E. 2d, 135), where similar general charter provisions were held to include the power of the city to regulate and control traffic and parking on the city's public streets. So in the present case, the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Milledgeville, having power to enact ordinances necessary to enforce peace, order and good government, and having "general and exclusive jurisdiction over the streets, alleys, by-ways, sidewalks and commons and public squares of said city," were authorized to enact the ordinance in question, providing for maximum speeds on streets and street intersections within the corporate limits of the city.

7. We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the petition alleged facts sufficient to warrant submission of evidence in support, thereof to a jury on the issues of whether the defendant's operation of the truck constituted either ordinary negligence or negligence per se, or both, and whether such negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the injury and damage to the plaintiff. The court did not err in overruling the general demurrer to the petition.

Judgment affirmed. Felton and Worrill, JJ., concur.