If one attempts to cross a county bridge in a vehicle containing a load in excess of the load-limit signs posted on the approaches to the bridge, and is killed by the collapse of the bridge brought about by such load, there can be no recovery for the death.

Mrs. Lorene Brantley sued Baldwin County for damaged for the death of her husband who the petition alleged was killed when he attempted to cross a bridge on a public road in Baldwin County in a truck loaded with logs. The petition further alleged: "5. Defendant negligently and carelessly allowed and suffered said bridge to become and continue to be unsafe for usual and heavy traffic; that Board of County Commissioners of said county, at December 1947 meeting, passed an order that a load limit sign of 6000 pounds be placed at said bridge, however, defendant did not make said bridge safe and capable of bearing usual and heavy traffic thereon. 6. That on November 9, 1948, while plaintiff's husband was passing over said bridge with a truck loaded with logs, said bridge suddenly collapsed and plaintiff's husband with said logs and truck dropped through said bridge a distance of some 50 feet to the water, causing death of plaintiff's husband to ensue instantly; county had knowledge of fact that many trucks with similar loads passed over said bridge frequently. 7. That it was legal duty of defendant to keep said bridge and road in repair for use of public travel thereon, including heavy traffic, as it was imperative that heavy traffic traverse the route over this bridge regularly and this being nearest, moot practical and only road that plaintiff's husband could travel with said load of logs. 8. That death of plaintiff's husband was caused by negligence of defendant, defendant well knowing that said bridge was unsafe for usual or heavy traffic, which was forced to pass over same and did not repair or reinforce said bridge so that it could carry usual and heavy traffic; that defendant negligently failed to keep said bridge in a reasonable and safe repair so that persons traveling thereon with trucks loaded with logs or other usual, ordinary and heavy loads could use same with convenience and safety. 9. Defendant was negligent in failing to inspect and discover the defects in said bridge; that defendant knew or could have known by exercise of ordinary care and diligence of defects and weaknesses of said bridge long prior to November 9, 1948, and knew of said defects and dangerous condition which existed for some time, without remedying same, and defendant can not be relieved of its legal duty by merely placing a load limit sign thereon, even though said load of logs weighed in excess of the maximum gross weight shown on load limit sign posted at both approaches to said bridge." The court sustained the general demurrer to the petition and dismissed the action, to which judgment the plaintiff excepted.

Code 95-906 provides: "The ordinary or commissioners of roads and revenues may ascertain and determine the maximum load or weight that can, with safety, be transported over any bridge and its approaches other than those on State-aid roads, and to post on any such bridge a legible notice showing the maximum amount which has been so ascertained such bridge or its approaches can carry with safety. It shall be unlawful for any person to haul, drive, or otherwise bring on such bridge or its approaches any load or weight exceeding the rated capacity so ascertained and posted, and any person hauling, driving, or otherwise bringing on any such bridge or its approaches any load or weight exceeding the weighted capacity so ascertained and posted shall do so at his own risk, and the county shall not be liable for any damages to persons or property that may result therefrom." By necessary inference the petition alleged that the weight of the truck and its load caused the collapse of the bridge. Under the express provision of the foregoing Code section the county is not liable for the injury here sued for. Irrespective of whether the county Was negligent in not providing a bridge which would support the usual and ordinary traffic, the Code provides in effect that the operation of a vehicle over such a bridge, with the load limit properly posted, is such negligence as bars a recovery for any injury resulting. The section is a statutory application of the doctrine of the last-clear chance of avoiding injury. Code 23-1502 provides: "A county is not liable to suit for any cause of action unless made so by statute." The act of 1922 (Ga. L. 1922, pp. 115, 116; Code, 95-906), had the effect of modifying 95-I(X)1 to the extent that no one disobeying a load-limit sign on a bridge can recover for an injury caused by such disobedience. The contention that the provision for such load-limit signs is designed merely as a temporary precaution is not a far-fetched contention, and possibly should be the law, but there is not room for such a construction of the law. It provides for the posting of the load-limits without limitation or reservation. If any change is to be made it must be left to the law-making body. This court cannot correct a defect if in fact any exists.

The court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer and in dismissing the action.

Judgment affirmed. Sutton, C. J., and Worrill, J., concur.