The petition was good as against the general demurrer.

Mrs. Jay Guyton, plaintiff in the court below, whom we shall designate as the plaintiff, brought suit against J. H. Brawner, defendant in the court below, whom we shall call the defendant. Paragraph 1 of the petition alleged that the plaintiff was the widow of Jay Guyton. Paragraph 2 alleged the residence of the defendant. Paragraph 3 alleged that, "On the 12th day Of March, 1949, the defendant took the life of Jay Guyton, husband of the petitioner, wilfully, maliciously and negligently by shooting him with a certain pistol and thereby has injured and damaged petitioner in the sum of at least five thousand ($5,000) dollars." Paragraph 4 Of the petition alleged, "Petitioner is entitled to sue for the full value of the life of her said husband" and said he was able-bodied, making and capable of making the sum of $4 per day and that he was 34 years of age and had a reasonable life expectancy of 31.68 years. Paragraph 5 of the petition alleged that the defendant owned certain property, and described it, and alleged the value of it. Paragraph 6 asked injunctive relief prohibiting the defendant. from changing the title or status of the property alleged in paragraph 5, and prayed for process and that record be made by the clerk of the court in accord with Code 67-2802, as lis pendens. The defendant filed a general demurrer whereupon the plaintiff amended paragraph 3 of the petition and, "says the defendant while her husband was near edge of Puckett St., Cartersville, Ga., near store of defendant lifted a pistol and fired it in such manner as to strike the breast and body of Jay Guyton with a pistol ball and produced mortal wounds on him that caused his death."

After amendment allowed the defendant renewed his general demurrer on the ground, "The petition of the plaintiff does not set out a cause of action against the defendant." The court overruled the general demurrer. The case proceeded to trial and resulted in a verdIct of $2,000 in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant made no motion for a new trial but within the time provided by law brought the case here for review by a direct bill of exceptions to the judgment of the court overruling the general demurrer.

The only question before this court is, was the petition sufficient to withstand a general demurrer? Counsel for the defendant calls our attention to Fowler v. Southern Airlines Inc., 192 Ga. 845 (4) (16 S. E. 2d, 897), in which the court said: "No cause of action is stated in a petition which states mere legal conclusions with no facts alleged on which to base them; nor will the use of epithets supply the place of facts; nor are general and loose allegations, consisting merely of the statement of conclusions, without averring the facts upon which the conclusions are based, sufficiently definite to raise an issue."

Counsel also calls our attention to Jones v. Ezell, 134 Ga. 553 (5) (68 S. E. 303): "General and loose allegations, consisting merely of the statement of conclusions, without averring the facts upon which the conclusions are based, are too indefinite to raise an issue."

We have read all of the cases cited above, and when we compare the allegations of fact of the petitions in the cases set forth above, we think that the allegations of fact in the instant case are quite different from the allegations of fact in the cases cited. The excerpts from the Supreme Court cases as set forth as we have herein above quoted are generally correct as abstract principles of law, but we think that a careful reading of those cases will reveal that the attack was made by a special demurrer and not by a general demurrer. They were equity cases, if we interpret aright, the general statements as quoted have reference to an attack by a special demurrer and not by general demurrer only, as appears in the instant case. The case of Armour & Co. v. Miller, supra, as expressed in headnote 3 was also written in the light of an attack by a special demurrer and not by general demurrer. Judge Jenkins who rendered the decision in that case in the course of his discussion in division 3 of the opinion said this: "As was said by the Supreme Court in the Hudgins case [122 Ga. 695, 50 S. E. 974], in ruling that a mere general averment of negligence will not suffice when called upon by special demurrer to specify the particulars thereof: 'Of course there are limitations to this rule and cases arise where the line must be drawn. The plaintiff must not be too general, and the defendant must not be too particular.' "

Upon a study of the cases cited, regarding their facts and pleadings, as compared with the instant case under its alleged facts and pleadings, we do not think the court erred in overruling the general demurrer. Code 105-1302 authorizes the widow to recover for the homicide of her husband. The question of negligence, ordinary care, and the amount of the recovery, is a jury question. The petition in the instant case alleges, in general tends at least, how the husband of the plaintiff came to his death; that it was the negligence of the defendant in pointing a pistol at the deceased and firing therefrom a bullet into the body of the deceased which caused his death. In such an action the plaintiff is not required to negative contributory negligence on the part of, in this case, the deceased. See, in this connection, Fisher Motor Co. v. Seymour & Allen, 9 Ga. App. 465 (1) (71 S. E. 764).

The Supreme Court, in Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 523 (23 S. E. 414), said: "Nor is it necessary, as contended by counsel for the plaintiff in error that sue in wrongful or negligent acts should be criminal in their nature, in order to render the employer [defendant] responsible. The act of 1887, supra, declares that the word 'homicide' as used therein shall be held to include all cases where the death of a human being results from a crime or from criminal 'or other negligence.' "

The court did not err in overruling the general demurrer to the petition.

Judgment affirmed. MacIntyre, P. J., and Townsend, J., concur.