Appellee, the plaintiff in garnishment, is a Douglas County corporation. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the attack upon the Fulton County judgment. We reverse.

CPA 181 (Code Ann. 81A-181) provides: "This Title shall apply to all special statutory proceedings except to the extent that specific rules of practice and procedure in conflict herewith are expressly prescribed by law, but, in any event, the provisions of this Title governing . . . relief from judgments . . . shall apply to all such proceedings." Under Code Ann. 46-305, "[t]he procedure in garnishment cases shall be uniform in all courts throughout this State, and except as otherwise provided in this Title, the Georgia Civil Practice Act [Title 81A] shall apply in garnishment proceedings." In order to determine whether the Douglas County Superior Court has jurisdiction in this case, we must consult the provision of the CPA governing relief from judgments, CPA 60 (Code Ann. 81A-160), and cases decided thereunder.

CPA 60 (b) provides: "A judgment may be attacked by motion for new trial, motion to set aside, or by complaint in equity. Judgments may be attacked by motion only in the court of rendition. Judgments may be attacked by complaint in equity in any superior court of appropriate jurisdiction." (Emphasis supplied.) "[T]his court has held in Canal Ins. Co. v. Cambron, 240 Ga. 708 (242 SE2d 32) (1978), that Code Ann. 110-709, not repealed by the CPA, allows a party through a subsection (e) complaint in equity to attack a judgment void for any cause. 240 Ga. at 712. Since a complaint in equity will lie to attack a judgment void due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, and since an action in equity must be brought in the county of the defendant's residence . . . it was error . . . to dismiss appellant's complaint." Bonneau v. Ohme, 244 Ga. 184 (259 SE2d 631) (1979).

Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, Herbert D. Shellhouse, for appellant.