1  "[S]uch selection should not be interfered with or controlled by the courts, unless made in bad faith, or capriciously or wantonly injurious, or in some respect beyond the privilege conferred by statute or its chapter." Piedmont Cotton Mills v. Georgia R. &c. Co., 131 Ga. 129, 134 (62 SE 52) (1908).

2  " 'In the absence of bad faith, the exercise of the right of eminent domain rests largely in the discretion of the authority exercising such right, as to the necessity, and what and how much land shall be taken.' King v. City of McCaysville, 198 Ga. 829 (33 SE2d 99) (1945); Kellett v. Fulton County, 215 Ga. 551 (111 SE2d 364) (1959)." City of Atlanta v. Heirs of Champion, 244 Ga. 620, 621 (261 SE2d 343) (1979).

3  " 'Bad faith' is not simply had judgment or negligence, but it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity, and implies conscious doing of wrong, and means breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. . . ." 'Bad faith,' though an indefinite term, differs from the negative idea of negligence, in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with a furtive design or some motive of interest or ill will." Vickers v. Motte, 109 Ga. App. 615, 619-20 (137 SE2d 77) (1964).

4  ". . . . unless the determination made by the condemning authority is birthed by fraud or bad faith on the part of the condemning authority." Coffee v. Atkinson County, 236 Ga. 248, 249 (223 SE2d 648) (1976).

5  Assuming, incorrectly, that the special master, the trial court and the Court of Appeals had a right in this case to determine whether the original site selected for the "kiss-ride lot" was adequate for MARTA's needs, and further assuming that the original site was in fact adequate for those purposes, the judgment of the Court of Appeals still would be erroneous because the mere fact that the original location was feasible, practicable and desirable would not of itself force MARTA to utilize it in lieu of the property here sought to be condemned. Piedmont Cotton Mills v. Georgia R. &c. Co., 131 Ga. 129, 133-34 (62 SE 52) (1908)." 'A landowner can not prevent the taking of his property for public purposes merely because there is other property which might have been suitable for the purpose.' " Miller v. Ga. Power Co., 222 Ga. 239, 241 (149 SE2d 479) (1966); Miles v. Brown, 223 Ga. 557, 559 (156 SE2d 898) (1967).

6  The present case is distinguishable from Heirs of Champion, supra, in that here