This case is an appeal from an order of February 13, 1980, setting aside a divorce. In June, 1978, wife filed a complaint for separate maintenance. Husband answered and counterclaimed for divorce on the ground that the marriage was irretrievably broken. In July, 1978, husband took an uncontested divorce, and all issues of alimony, support, custody, and division of property were reserved. The decree specifically stated that husband would have the right to remarry. On December 4, 1979, wife filed a motion to set aside the judgment as void. The motion was granted February 13, 1980.

Absent a defect of jurisdiction, the judgment here, which is not void on its face, may not be set aside. 1 Consequently, the threshold question is whether the wife's action is such as would preclude her from attacking the judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction. We have held that where a party signed an acknowledgment of service or a settlement agreement, she had committed an affirmative act which would preclude her attacking the decree as void. See, e.g., Williams v. Pique, supra; Johnson v. Johnson, supra. Here, neither of these readily recognizable indicia of submission to the jurisdiction of the court was present. However, we find that wife's actions prior to and subsequent to the granting of the divorce constitute such affirmative actions as will estop her from now attacking the decree as void.

Following the answer and counterclaim for divorce by husband, wife did not answer the counterclaim. An answer to a counterclaim is not required in any civil case and the allegations automatically stand denied. Code Ann. 81A-112 (a). Further, an answer to a complaint for divorce is not required, default being impermissible in a divorce action. Code Ann. 30-113; Wallace v. Wallace, 229 Ga. 607 (193 SE2d 832) (1972). However, when a defendant in a divorce action fails to file defensive pleadings, the divorce is uncontested, and failure to file defensive pleadings constitutes a waiver of notice and hearing on the taking of the final decree. Code Ann. 81A-105 (a); Hardwick v. Hardwick, 245 Ga. 570 (266 SE2d 184) (1980). This rule should apply as well when the claim for divorce arises by way of counterclaim. Consequently, having submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court in regard to her main claim, and having elected not to contest husband's counterclaim for divorce, wife at least passively submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court in regard to the counterclaim. In addition, the record contains an affidavit of husband's former attorney to the effect that he informed the former attorney of his intention to take a divorce on July 14, 1978, and that he was assured that wife did not intend to contest the divorce.

Shortly after the divorce, husband remarried. Wife admitted in her deposition that she knew of the remarriage by "late August" of 1978. Yet, it was not until December of 1979 that she brought her motion to set aside the divorce. The stability of the family, and indeed of society, demands that one who intends to attack a decree of divorce apparently valid on its face should proceed with the utmost promptness. Sikes v. Sikes, 231 Ga. 105 (200 SE2d 259) (1973); McConnell v. McConnell, 135 Ga. 828 (70 SE 647) (1910). The acts and omissions of the wife prior to the divorce decree coupled with her failure to proceed promptly following the decree are sufficient to constitute an affirmative course of conduct which, when relied upon by husband, estops her from attacking the divorce as void.

Timothy N. Skidmore, for appellee.