After issuance of a rule nisi the trial court heard evidence in the form of affidavits and rendered judgment denying the plaintiff's prayers for a temporary injunction. It is from this judgment that the plaintiff appeals. Held:
1. The name "Chateau" is a descriptive word meaning: "1. a feudal castle or fortress in France; 2. a large country house: mansion; 3. a French vineyard estate esp. in the Bordeaux wine region--often used prepositively in compounds naming such estates and their wines (as Chateau-Haut-Brion, the name of a vineyard in the Graves district in Gironde and the red Burgundy produced from its grapes)." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1966, p. 380. "1. a French castle. 2. a stately residence imitating a French castle. 3. a country estate, esp. a fine one." The American College Dictionary, 1967, p. 204. Thus, unless the word has acquired a secondary meaning as defined in Dolphin Homes Corp. v. Tocomc Develop. Corp., 223 Ga. 455
, 456 (156 SE2d 45
); Multiple Listing Service, Inc. v. Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 223 Ga. 837 (159 SE2d 52)
, and citations, the plaintiff was not entitled to a temporary injunction prohibiting the defendant from operating his liquor and beer store under the name "Chateau Package Store."
2. "If the trial judge in refusing an interlocutory injunction bases his refusal upon the ground that the evidence was in conflict or if the trial judge enters a mere general judgment refusing an interlocutory injunction, this court will not reverse the judgment in either case if it appears that the evidence was in conflict, because such a judgment was entered in the exercise of the trial judge's discretion. Ballard v. Waites, 194 Ga. 427 (1) (21 SE2d 848)
." Milton Frank Allen Publications v. Ga. Assn. of Petroleum Retailers, 223 Ga. 784
, 787 (158 SE2d 248
3. The evidence adduced by affidavits showed the plaintiff's use of the name "Chateau Fleur de Lis" and "Chateau Lounge" in connection with a restaurant and lounge and of the use of the word "Chateau" in connection with bakeries at three different locations before the defendant began operating a retail liquor and beer store. However, the defendant presented affidavits of the use of "Chateau" by other businesses in the Atlanta area as well as of the general use of the word "Chateau" in connection with wine and beverages which would authorize the trial court to deny the temporary injunction.
Arnall, Golden & Gregory, II, Fred Gober, for appellee.