1. This court, in considering the question of the grant of an application for the writ of certiorari, and, if granted in disposing of the case, will consider only the rulings made by the Court of Appeals upon which error is assigned in the application for the writ. Certiorari Rule 45, Code 24-4549; Mitchell v. Owen, 159 Ga. 690
(127 S. E. 122); Simpson v. Bradley, 189 Ga. 316
(5 S. E. 2d 893); Galfas v. Ailor, 206 Ga. 76
(55 S. E. 2d 582); Trammell v. Throgmorton, 210 Ga. 659
(82 S. E. 2d 140), and citations.
2. The overruling of an objection to the admission of testimony on the ground that it is "irrelevant and immaterial" is not reversible error. Kirkland v. Ferris, 145 Ga. 93 (88 S. E. 680); Richardson v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 Ga. 340 (145 S. E. 448); Pippin v. State, 205 Ga. 316 (6) (53 S. E. 2d 482); Middleton v. Waters, 205 Ga. 847 (55 S. E. 2d 359). In Middleton's case, where there was an objection to the admission of certain documents on the ground that they were "irrelevant, immaterial, and illustrative of no issue in said case, but tended to confuse the issues," we unanimously held that the objection was too general to present anything for consideration.
3. Since no valid objection was made to the admission of the testimony complained of when it was offered on the trial, it necessarily follows that the ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.
L. M. Clough sued The Greyhound Corporation, d/b/a Florida Greyhound Lines, for damages in the Superior Court of Fulton County, alleging that he was injured and damaged by the defendant's negligence while riding as a passenger on one of its buses. The case resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted to a judgment denying his motion for a new trial and sued out a writ of error to the Court of Appeals. That court reversed the trial court. Clough v. The Greyhound Corporation, 91 Ga. App. 246
(85 S. E. 2d 476). On application therefor, this court granted the writ of certiorari. The only ruling complained of in the application relates to the admission of certain testimony given by G. H. Young, the defendant's district passenger agent at Gainesville, Florida. On redirect examination of this witness, the following occurred: Counsel for defendant: "Was there any charge outstanding against your driver when you got to the police station and reported this accident?" G. H. Young (the witness): "No, there wasn't." Counsel for plaintiff: "I object to that, whether or not there was any charge outstanding is irrelevant and immaterial." After a colloquy between the judge and counsel for the parties respecting the admissibility of the evidence objected to, but during which no other ground of objection to its admission was made, the court overruled the objection made by plaintiff's counsel. The Court of Appeals, with Chief Judge Felton dissenting, held that the allowance of this testimony wags erroneous and harmful, and that a new trial should have been granted because of its admission.