The appellant, Jamaine Smith, a minor at the time the crimes in question were committed, was tried as an adult and was convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. 1
He was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, and five years consecutive for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. We affirm.
The evidence revealed that on August 17, 1991, 16-year-old Jamaine Smith shot and killed Lawrence Sams over $20 worth of crack cocaine. Several days later, the police questioned Smith twice about the shooting. Between the two periods of questioning, Smith's stepfather told the police detective to cease the questioning. Smith was unaware of that conversation. During the second interview, Smith signed a waiver of his constitutional rights and confessed to the murder.
1. When considered in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith is guilty of the crimes charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Smith's sole contention is that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the second statement he gave to the police. He contends that the state did not meet the heavy burden of showing that Smith made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights under the totality of the circumstances test we established in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124
, 128 (226 SE2d 922
) (1976). Specifically, he contends that Riley was not met because the police did not adequately inform him of his rights, did not permit him to contact his girl friend, and did not tell him that his stepfather had asked the police to stop the interview. We find no error.
In Riley we held that the admissibility of a juvenile's statement turns on whether the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights and that the state has a heavy burden in showing that a juvenile did so. Whether a juvenile has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights depends on the totality of the circumstances, with consideration given to nine specific factors. 2
Id. at 128. Accord Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227
, 228-231 (282 SE2d 301
) (1981); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60
, 63-64 (2) (b) (401 SE2d 484
Turning to this case, the record reveals, contrary to Smith's contention, that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that Smith was informed of his rights, 3
and was given an opportunity to telephone his girl friend, but declined it. Moreover, although it is undisputed that the stepfather asked the police to stop the interview, this request does not require an automatic exclusion of the statement. We have held that a juvenile can knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights without the presence of a parent or guardian. Riley, supra, 237 Ga. at 128. We have also held that the exclusion of a juvenile's statement was not required where the police did not contact the juvenile's parents before the interrogation, and refused to allow a relative of the juvenile's to speak with the juvenile while he was at the police station. McBride, supra, 261 Ga. at 63-64. We conclude that in this case the detective's failure to inform Smith of his stepfather's request does not render the statement inadmissible. 4
Further, considering the totality of the circumstances, 5
we conclude that Smith knowingly and intelligently waived his rights and voluntarily made the statement in question.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Larry Chisolm, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paige M. Reese, Staff Attorney, for appellee.