The premises occupied by appellant had been leased through September 30, 1985, to Planes, Inc., which filed for bankruptcy sometime in the autumn of 1985. A notice to vacate, addressed to Planes, Inc. and Larry Block, an officer in the bankrupt corporation and president of appellant, was hand delivered by appellee's agent at the beginning of November 1985. At the time of the delivery, appellee was orally notified that appellant would be occupying the premises after Planes, Inc.'s bankruptcy proceedings. Appellant came into possession of the premises in late November or early December 1985. Appellee's agent testified at the hearing that other than the notice to vacate addressed to Planes, Inc., no demand for possession was made upon appellant other than the filing of the dispossessory writ on January 30, 1986. A check in the amount of $1,128.75, dated January 10, 1986, from appellant to appellee for January rent, was deposited by appellee on January 20, 1986.

See Lunsford Co. v. Klingenberg, 138 Ga. App. 791, 792-793 (2-3) (227 SE2d 507) (1976).

Thus, it appears that uncontroverted evidence negating an essential element of appellee's case was introduced during appellee's case-in-chief. A directed verdict in appellant's favor was thereby demanded and the trial court erred by denying appellant's motion. OCGA 9-11-50 (a); see generally Federal Ins. Co. v. Paulk, 173 Ga. App. 266, 268 (325 SE2d 886) (1985). It follows that the trial court erred by granting a writ of possession to appellee. See generally Whipper v. Kirk, 156 Ga. App. 218, 221 (1) (274 SE2d 662) (1980).